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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Respondent Chevron U.S.A. Inc. ("Chevron") agrees with 
Appellant Sandy City that jurisdiction is conferred upon this 
Court. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Chevron agrees that this is an appeal taken from a 
judgment of dismissal entered against Sandy City on defendants' 
motions for summary judgment, and that the Order of Dismissal 
was entered on April 8, 1988. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Chevron disagrees with Sandy's description of issues 
presented on appeal. Chevron believes there is a single issue 
presented, and that is whether or not, based on the material 
undisputed facts and the law, the action of Sandy City should 
have been dismissed. 
STATUTES, RULES AND ORDINANCES DETERMINATIVE OF ISSUES 
The interpretation of the following enactments, set 
forth in addenda to this brief, is determinative in this 
appeal: (1) Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
(Addendum 1A); (2) Section 10-2-418 of the Utah Code Annotated 
(Addendum IB); (3) Section 10-1-104(11), Utah Code Annotated 
(Addendum 1C); and (4) Section 19.84.090 of the Salt Lake 
County Ordinances (Addendum ID). Chevron does not believe that 
the other enactments cited by Sandy are either relevant or 
determinative. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. 
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This action involves a Chevron service station located 
on a 0.7 acre parcel on the northwest corner of 10600 South and 
1300 East Streets in unincorporated Salt Lake County. Sandy 
City commenced this action in the District Court after the Salt 
Lake County Commission upheld the decision of the Salt Lake 
County Planning Commission granting a conditional use permit to 
Chevron's agent, Postero-Blecker, Inc. This permit allowed 
Chevron to develop its facility. Sandy alleged that the 
decision to grant the conditional use permit violated state 
statute and county ordinances, and that the decision was 
arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable. Sandy also attacked 
the Salt Lake County Commission's prior decision to rezone for 
commercial uses a larger 4.18 acre parcel containing the 
Chevron parcel. 
Separate motions for summary judgment were filed in 
January 1988 by Chevron, the Salt Lake County defendants, and 
defendants Yeates, Priest, Kjar and Smoot. Sandy City filed a 
cross-motion for summary judgment against defendants, and a 
motion to strike portions of defendants affidavits and 
memoranda. All parties' motions for summary judgment were 
heard by the Court on February 5, 1988. On February 18, 1988, 
defendant Salt Lake County moved for an order certifying to the 
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District Court the record of all proceedings before the Salt 
Lake County Planning Commission and County Commission on the 
contested zoning and conditional use applications. An indexed 
copy of this record (the "County Record") was filed with the 
Court at hearing of Salt Lake County's motion on February 25, 
1988, and is now part of the record on appeal. On March 15, 
1988, the District Court entered a memorandum decision granting 
all defendants' motions for summary judgment, and denying Sandy 
City's motion for summary judgment and motion to strike. On 
April 8, 1988, the Court entered its Order and Judgment of 
Dismissal dismissing Sandy City's complaint. Sandy City then 
filed its Notice of Appeal, and this appeal follows. 
II. 
STATUTORY SCHEME FOR ZONING AND BUILDING 
Pursuant to § 10-9-1, et seq., Utah Code Annotated, 
1987-1988, a municipality is empowered to act with respect to 
zoning and building permit matters affecting lands within 
municipality boundaries. 
The County Record was added to the record on appeal by 
order of the Court of Appeals on September 20, 1988, upon 
stipulation of all parties. The County Record is not numbered 
consecutively, but rather consists of six individually indexed 
envelopes. Citations to the County Record in this brief will 
be made by envelope and document number, e.g. Envelope 2, Doc. 
4. 
-3-
A county is empowered to act with respect to zoning 
and building permit matters affecting lands within the 
unincorporated areas of a county (§ 17-27-1, et seq., Utah Code 
Annotated, 1987-1988). 
The foregoing is the jurisdiction to which the public 
must normally look as concerns zoning, zoning changes, 
non-conforming uses and building permits. That was the 
statutory scheme at the time of the events which are the 
subject of this action. 
Correlatively, it is a municipal obligation to furnish 
services and to have revenue powers within municipality 
boundaries. And, it is the county obligation to furnish 
services within the unincorporated areas of a county and to 
have revenue powers therein. 
The foregoing lines of authority are well-defined and 
have been well-established historically. There has been no 
reason for guess work as to where an interested party would go 
for approvals for land use and building permits. 
Section 10-2-418, Utah Code Annotated, 1987-1988, set 
forth hereinafter, impacts on the foregoing provisions. It was 
intended to allow a municipality to annex, under defined 
conditions, lands not otherwise within an incorporated area. 
Those conditions are well-stated. 
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(a) The municipality may propose a Municipal 
expansion policy if it chooses for lands within one-half mile 
of the municipality. Section 10-2-414 sets forth what must be 
contained in said ?,policy declaration." The said policy 
declaration in effect amounts to a preliminary guideline. 
(b) The municipality must be "willing to annex the 
territory proposed for such development." 
Assuming that a municipality has either not adopted a 
policy declaration meeting the requirements of § 10-2-414 or 
has not manifested a "willingness to annex" in the manner 
required by § 10-2-415, then § 10-2-418 does not come into play 
and the jurisdiction as to unincorporated lands within a county 
would remain within the jurisdiction of the county. 
III. 
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS 
The following are the undisputed facts upon which the 
District Court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants 
and against plaintiff Sandy City. Although Sandy attempts to 
state the unrefuted facts, Sandy's brief fails to set forth a 
great many of the important undisputed facts. Other facts 
stated by Sandy as unrefuted are argumentative, not referenced 
to the record and not material. The material undisputed facts 
are as follows: 
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THE PARTIES 
1. Sandy City is a Utah municipality with powers 
granted by Utah statute. 
2. Defendant Salt Lake County is a subdivision of 
the State of Utah organized and functioning under the authority 
of Title 17 of the Utah Code. Defendant Salt Lake County 
Planning Commission is a commission duly appointed by Salt Lake 
County and operating under the authority of Chapter 27, Title 
17, of the Utah Code. 
3. Defendants Chevron and Postero-Blecker, Inc. are, 
respectively, Pennsylvania and Arizona corporations authorized 
to do business in Utah. Postero-Blecker acted as Chevron's 
ag^ ent in land acquisition and permitting. 
4. Defendants Yeates, Priest, Kjar and Smoot (the 
"Individual Defendants") were the owners of a 4.18 acre parcel 
of land located at the northwest corner of 10600 South and 1300 
East Streets in unincorporated Salt Lake County, described in 
this brief as the "Original Property." (R. 003-004). 
JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT PROPERTY 
5. At the time these proceedings commenced, Chevron, 
through its agent Postero-Blecker, held an interest in a 
portion of the Original Property at the northwest corner of 
10600 South and 1300 East, intended for the location of a 
combined service station, convenience store and carwash (the 
"Chevron station"). (R. 050, R. 020). Chevron had no interest 
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in any development other than that of the Chevron station. (R. 
0108). 
6. Throughout this action, all property involved 
was, and currently is, within unincorporated Salt Lake County. 
(R. 004). 
7. Although the subject property is included in 
Sandy City's zoning policy declaration area, Sandy City has not 
enacted any ordinance approving annexation or expressing intent 
to do so. (R. 028). 
8. Paragraph 2 of a September 18, 1987 letter from 
Sandy City to Salt Lake County states, "Sandy is currently 
considering annexation." (R. 023). Again, on October 14, 
1987, Sandy, in a letter to the County Commission, stated 
"Sandy is currently considering annexation." (R. 028). On 
November 19, 1987, a letter from the Sandy City Attorney to 
counsel for the Individual Defendants, after suggesting a 
meeting would be useful, stated "Of course, I do not mean to 
imply by this letter that a decision on annexation or zoning 
will be made in an informal meeting with your clients." (R. 
202). 
9. The Little Cottonwood District Development Plan, 
a portion of the County Master Plan which includes the area in 
question, was adopted in 1976 and expired by its terms in 
1985. (District Dev. Plan, Envelope 3, Doc. 11, p. 1). The 
District Plan was intended to guide short-term development 
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through 1985. ( Id.) Sandy City has approved commercial 
development on property, directly across the street from the 
subject property, which has the identical classification in the 
plan. (Envelope 3, Doc. 1, p. 3; Envelope 3, Doc. 11, map). 
PROCEEDINGS AT THE COUNTY LEVEL 
10. On or about April 9, 1987, defendant Yeates 
applied to the Salt Lake County Planning Commission for 
rezoning of the Original Property from R-l-8 to C-2 and 
R-M/Zc. (R. 0015). The Planning Commission approved the 
rezoning, and the Salt Lake County Commission adopted a zoning 
ordinance effecting the requested rezoning on August 5, 1988. 
(R. 0005). 
11. On August 26, 1987, Defendant Postero-Blecker, on 
behalf of Chevron, applied to Salt Lake County for a 
Conditional Use permit for construction of the Chevron station 
on approximately 0.7 acres of the Original Property (the 
MChevron parcel"). The Chevron Station was the only 
development proposed in the application. (R. 0020). Addendum 
2. 
12. On October 13, 1987, the County Planning 
Commission approved the conditional use application for the 
Chevron station. The Planning Commission's approval came after 
two public hearings at which the Planning Commission heard 
evidence. (R. 0107-0115). On October 14, 1987, Sandy City 
appealed that decision to the Salt Lake County Commission. 
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13. Evidence before the Planning Commission at the 
time it made its decision to issue the conditional use permit 
included the following: 
(a) testimony in support of the Chevron 
application by local residents and neighbors of the 
proposed Chevron station (R. 0109-0110); 
(b) testimony in support of the application by 
representatives of the White City Community Council 
and the United Association of Community Councils (R. 
0110); 
(c) explanations of the benefits of the proposal 
by Chevron representatives and the property owners (R. 
0113; Envelope 3, Doc. Nos. 3, 7); 
(d) testimony concerning the safety hazard that 
would be created by preserving the parcel for 
residential use, due to the volume of traffic at the 
intersection (R. 0110); and 
(e) recommendations of approval by various 
administrative entities, including the county traffic 
engineer and the Department of Environmental Health 
(Envelope 3, Doc. No. 2). 
14. On October 21, 1988, the County Commission denied 
the City's request for appeal and upheld the Planning 
Commission decision. 
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15. Chevron applied to the Salt Lake Building 
Inspection Department for a building permit for its proposed 
station upon Chevron parcel in the regular manner, and a 
building permit was issued by the Department on or about: 
November 5, 1987. (R. 0179-0184). The building permit places 
construction costs of Chevron's station at $175,000. (R. 
183). Addendum 3. 
16. Chevron does not have and has never had at any 
time any plan for second phase of development, its interest 
being only the development of the Chevron station. (R. 0108). 
17. The Chevron station, including the underlying 
land, is owned and operated separately from all other potential 
development on the northwest corner of 10600 South 1300 East, 
and all permits for the station were obtained separately and 
independently from any other development. (R. 0180) 
DISPOSITION IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
18. On November 6, 1987, Sandy City filed its 
verified complaint in Third District Court. (R. 0002-0034). 
The Sandy complaint does not appeal any permit decision other 
than the Chevron permit. ( Id.) Answers to the complaint 
were filed by the defendants in December 1987 and January 1988. 
19. Motions for summary judgment were filed by all 
defendants in January, 1988. On January 26, 1988, the City 
responded with its own motion for summary judgment. Motions by 
the City and Chevron were accompanied by affidavits and 
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memoranda. The City filed a Motion to Strike certain portions 
of defendant's affidavits and other documents, and Chevron 
filed a Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion to Strike. 
20. On February 5, 1988, the Court heard the motions 
for summary judgment and Motion to Strike. (R. 219). Counter 
affidavits were filed by the City and by Chevron on the day 
prior to the hearing. 
21. On the day of the hearing, Defendant Salt Lake 
County filed the record from the zoning and permit proceedings 
before the Planning Commission and County Commission. On 
February 18, 1988, Salt Lake County filed a Motion for 
Certification of the County Record, together with supplemental 
related documents, which motion was granted at the hearing on 
February 25. (R. 252). The record was certified and filed 
with the Court on or about February 27, 1988. 
22. On March 15, 1988, the Court filed a Memorandum 
Decision denying the City's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Motion to Strike and granting defendants Motions for Summary 
Judgment and Salt Lake County's Motion for Certification. On 
April 8, 1988, the Court entered its formal Order and Judgment 
of Dismissal. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
No material issues of fact existed before the District 
Court, and the Court properly held that Chevron was entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. The purported factual issues 
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raised by Sandy are either immaterial in light of applicable 
law, or involve an improper attempt to reopen the county 
decision-making process and therefore outside the record. 
1. Applicable Law Supports Summary Judgment. The 
District Court did not err in interpreting Utah Code Ann. 
§ 10-2-418 and related statutes. Section 10-2-418 places 
certain limits on County decisions to approve Murban 
development" within a city's zoning policy declaration area if 
the City is "willing" to annex the property. The District 
Court correctly held, as a matter of law, that the Chevron 
conditional use application must be considered alone in 
determining if it was "urban development;" and that Sandy had 
not been "willing" to annex at the requisite time as required 
to invoke the statute. 
With either of these legal issues resolved in favor 
of Chevron, the purported factual issues raised by Sandy 
concerning willingness to annex or the project's connection 
with other development become immaterial. Likewise, because 
trade fixtures and land can be excluded as a matter of law in 
determining if the cost threshold of urban development is met, 
the purported factual issue concerning Chevron's development 
costs is also no longer material. Issues of fact, if not 
material, do not bar summary judgment. 
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2. The District Court Applied the Proper Standard 
of Review. 
Sandy appealed to the District Court from decisions of 
the Salt Lake County Planning Commission and Board of County 
Commissioners. These bodies heard evidence, considered 
voluminous documentation, and made decisions to approve the 
Chevron project. Sandy's claim that factual issues exist 
concerning compliance with County ordinances misstates the 
applicable standard of review. Review of County land use 
decisions at the District Court level is not de novo, but 
rather is review on the record to determine if the decision was 
arbitrary and capricious. The fact that Sandy City now 
disputes the evidence before the County (or did so at the 
County level) does not create any material factual issue. The 
only real issue is whether evidence existed to support the 
County's decision, and this issue was proper for determination 
on summary judgment. The record supports the District Court's 
decision. 
3. The Court Ruled Properly on Evidentiary Matters 
The denial of Sandy's motion to strike was not error. 
The Court may properly consider items in the record other than 
This evidence and documentation makes up the majority of 
the supplemental record now before the Court of Appeals. 
-13-
affidavits in determining a motion for summary judgment, as 
Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure makes clear. 
The materials filed by Chevron were properly before the Court 
in determining its motion. The records filed by the County 
constituted the official record of this proceeding before the 
County Commission and County Planning Commission, and thus were 
also properly considered by the Court in ruling on the defense 
motions. Finally, given the Court's determination of the legal 
issues involved in favor of defendants, Rule 56(f) Utah R. Civ. 
P. did not require the Court to grant Sandy further discovery. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY 
INTERPRETED UTAH STATUTES 
IN FINDING THAT THE CHEVRON STATION 
DID NOT CONSTITUTE URBAN DEVELOPMENT 
Sandy City claims that the District Court incorrectly 
interpreted Utah Code Ann. §10-2-418. That statute provides: 
Urban development shall not be approved or 
permitted within one-half mile of a 
municipality in the unincorporated territory 
which the municipality has proposed for 
municipal expansion in its policy 
declaration, if a municipality is willing to 
annex the territory proposed for such 
development under the standards and 
requirements set forth in this chapter; 
provided, however, that a property owner 
desiring to develop or improve property within 
the said one-half mile area may notify the 
municipality in writing of said desire and 
identify with particularity all legal and 
factual barriers preventing an annexation to 
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the municipality. At the end of 12 
consecutive months from the filing with the 
municipality of said notice and after a good 
faith and diligent effort by said property 
owner to annex, said property owner may 
develop as otherwise permitted by law. Urban 
development beyond one-half mile of a 
municipality may be restricted or an impact 
statement required when agreed to in an 
interlocal agreement, under the provisions of 
the Interlocal Co-operation Act. (Emphasis 
added.) 
The District Court correctly held that the County's 
decision to allow the Chevron station did not violate Section 
10-2-418. 
Section 10-2-418 limits a countyfs discretion to 
"approve or permit" development within one-half mile of a 
municipal boundary only if three conditions are met: (1) the 
development must constitute "urban development" as defined in 
Utah Code Ann. 10-1-104(11); (2) the development must be 
within an area proposed for municipal expansion in the 
municipality's annexation policy declaration; and (3) the 
municipality must be willing to annex the development. Neither 
the first nor the third element required for the statute to be 
3 
applicable were present below, as a matter of law. The 
Chevron agrees that the Chevron parcel is within Sandy's 
annexation policy declaration area. However, as set forth in 
II, infra, the policy declaration is merely a general 
declaration of intent to annex at some future point, not 
current "willingness." 
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District Court correctly concluded, as a matter of law, that 
the Chevron station is not urban development, and that Sandy 
was not willing to annex the parcel at the time of the 
application. 
A. THE CHEVRON APPLICATION WAS THE ONLY DECISION TO 
"APPROVE OR PERMIT" DEVELOPMENT BEFORE THE COURT 
It is important to note that the urban development 
statute must initially be triggered by a county decision to 
fTapprove or permit" urban development. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 10-2-418. This threshold requirement has two implications 
for this case. First, the statute cannot apply to the County 
Commission's initial decision to rezone the original property 
from R-8 to C-2 and Rm/zc. The Commission's decision to rezone 
the property did not confer any ability upon the former owners 
to develop it absent further permitting. Similarly, Chevron 
was required by county ordinance to obtain a conditional use 
permit before constructing its facility; the new zoning alone 
did not allow it to begin construction once it purchased its 
parcel. Furthermore, the urban development statute is keyed to 
the costs of proposed development. Because development costs 
cannot be ascertained at the zoning stage, the statute cannot 
See II., infra p. 21 
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be applied at that point. Rezoning, by itself, is clearly not 
a decision to "approve or permit" urban development. Section 
10-2-418 does not apply to the County Commission's initial 
decision to change the zoning of the property. 
The more important implication of the "approve or 
permit" language in Section 10-2-418 is that the Chevron 
conditional use application must be considered separately in 
determining if "urban development" was proposed. Sandy seeks 
at length to tar Chevron with the brush of construction 
proposed by other owners as to other land, yet the only county 
decision to "approve or permit" development that Sandy chose to 
appeal to the District Court in this action involved Chevron1s 
conditional use application. It is undisputed that Chevron's 
application for a conditional use permit involved only the 
construction of the Chevron facility, not any further 
development. In granting the application, the Planning 
Commission and County Commission approved only the Chevron 
facility, nothing else. Sandy City appealed to the District 
Court only the County's decision concerning the Chevron 
application, not any other decision. This decision to "approve 
or permit" development is the only one relevant to determining 
whether urban development was present. The Chevron station is 
thus the only development that the County needed to consider in 
determining if urban development was present. 
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B. THE COUNTY AND THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY CONSIDERED 
THE CHEVRON PROPOSAL ON A STAND ALONE BASIS 
Sandy City claims that the statutory definition of 
urban development required the County, and the District Court 
on appeal, to consider potential development outside the 
Chevron parcel on the original property in deciding whether to 
grant Chevron's application. Section 10-1-104(11) defines 
"urban development" as "a housing development involving more 
than 15 residential units with an average of less than one acre 
per residential unit or a commercial or industrial development 
for which cost projections exceed $750,000 for any or all 
phases." Sandy contends that the Chevron application was only 
a "phase" of a single larger development. Particularly, Sandy 
believes that the value of the proposed McDonald's restaurant 
on an adjacent: parcel should have been combined with Chevron's 
in determining whether the $750,000 cost threshold was met. 
The District Court did not err in concluding, as a 
matter of law, that the County properly considered only the 
costs of the proposed Chevron facility in determining whether 
to approve it. The undisputed evidence before the Court 
demonstrated that the Chevron application involved a 
development unto itself, not a phase of a larger unitary 
development. The Chevron station was proposed to be designed 
by Chevron, constructed by Chevron, owned by Chevron and 
operated by Chevron. Once Chevron completed its purchase of 
its 0.7 acre parcel of essentially raw land from the owners of 
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the original property, any control by them over the design and 
development of the parcel ceased. Sandy had undertaken no suit 
against McDonalds at the time of the subject proceedings below. 
Sandy's interpretation of the statute is also 
unworkable in practice. It would require County authorities to 
assess whether speculative future development by separate 
owners might in the future exceed the $750,000 threshold. Each 
individual owner of a parcel would be hostage to his/her 
neighbors1 development plans for nearby parcels. No matter how 
modest the individual's development plans might be, approval 
would be precluded if a common grantee's prior development 
approached or exceeded the threshold. The statute is intended 
to apply to phased developments undertaken by single owners. 
The District Court correctly held that the Chevron application 
should be considered alone. 
C. THE CHEVRON STATION, AS A MATTER OF LAW, DOES NOT 
REACH THE URBAN DEVELOPMENT THRESHOLD 
Sandy also argues that, even if considered alone, the 
Chevron application exceeds the $750,000 threshold for "cost 
projections" set by Utah Code Ann. 10-1-104(11). This 
argument is based on a mistaken conception of what costs should 
be included in making this determination. Sandy argues that 
This is particularly true where, as here, the Chevron 
application was filed independently and where the Sandy appeal 
involved only the Chevron application. 
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land and trade fixture costs must be included in the 
determination. Indeed, Sandy must do so, since without 
either, its argument must fail. 
Sandyfs contention that land costs must be included 
would cause the urban development statute to have an 
inequitable and obviously unintended effect. Land costs vary 
dramatically, depending on location, date of purchase, and 
purpose and manner of acquisition. If land costs are included, 
a project built on land purchased years in the past might be 
allowed, while an identical project on recently purchased (and 
thus expensive) land would be barred. Inclusion of trade 
fixtures in the cost determination has an equally distorting 
effect. A million dollar machine could bar construction of one 
building while an identical one could proceed. Statutes should 
be given a reasonable interpretation, not one that will cause 
an arbitrary or unreasonable result. Curtis v. Harmon 
Electronics, Inc., 575 P.2d 1044 (Utah 1978). The urban 
development statute is intended to reach developments only when 
they reach a certain character and size. Sandy's 
interpretation would instead limit much development on the 
basis of arbitrary costs not related to the size of development. 
Similarly, the owner of a choice parcel (or a sufficiently 
large one) could be prevented from any construction - even a 
lemonade stand - while owners of less valuable parcels could 
develop at will. 
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The only logical measure of development costs is 
construction costs. This measure is consistent, easily 
ascertained--by viewing the building permit--and comports with 
the statute. Fixtures and land, as a matter of law, should 
not be included in the statutory determination. If either is 
omitted, no material factual issue on value exists. Without 
land or fixture costs, the Chevron station1s projected costs 
are undisputedly well below the $750,000 threshold, even if 
Sandy CityTs contentions concerning value of the Chevron 
o 
station are taken as true. Chevron is therefore entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. 
It is perfectly logical that the 10-1-104(11) is 
concerned with the impact of improvements on an area - not the 
impact of the land which would be there in any event. To 
illustrate, if a very minor and unobtrusive improvement were 
placed on a $1,000,000.00 property the impact of the 
improvement would be slight; and there would be no reason for 
10-1-104(11) to apply simply by reason of the land value. 
II. 
SANDY'S FAILURE TO EXPRESS WILLINGNESS TO ANNEX 
ALSO PRECLUDES APPLICATION OF THE 
URBAN DEVELOPMENT STATUTE 
Chevron's building permit places construction costs at 
$175,000. Addendum 3 
o 
See III.A., infra p. . 
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A., THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY REQUIRED 
EXPRESS WILLINGNESS TO ANNEX 
Section 10-2-418 restricts "urban development" within 
one-half mile of a municipality where the property involved is 
Min the unincorporated territory which the municipality has 
proposed for municipal expansion in its policy declaration, .if 
the municipality is willing to annex the territory . . . .ff 
(emphasis added). The District Court interpreted this language 
to require that the municipality indicate its willingness to 
annex in addition to having included the area in its policy 
declaration, and held that Sandy had not unequivocally done 
so. Sandy argues that inclusion of territory within the 
municipalityfs policy declaration area in itself satisfies the 
statutory requirement that Sandy be willing to annex the 
property. 
Sandy's argument would make surplusage of the 
independent requirement in the statute that the municipality be 
willing to annex. It is a basic axiom of statutory 
construction that legislation should be interpreted to give 
effect to all language contained in the statute. Gross v. City 
of Lynnwood, 583 P.2d 1197 (Wash. 1978). If the 
municipality's annexation policy declaration alone sufficed, a 
separate statutory requirement of willingness would not have 
been necessary. However, the policy declaration reflects a 
municipality's projected future growth over a number of years; 
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annexation of a particular parcel may be years in the future. 
Accordingly, an independent requirement in the statute of 
willingness was necessary to prevent undue delay of development 
merely because a parcel may be within a general policy 
declaration. 
The only logical form the required willingness can 
take is an ordinance or resolution approved by a vote of the 
body authorized to approve annexation. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 10-2-415. Such a commitment could be made simply and 
quickly. As a practical matter, the property owner needs such 
an official expression to determine if a petition to annex is 
necessary, and which governmental entity needs to be approached 
concerning zoning and permitting. 
Absent such commitment, under Sandyfs interpretation 
of the statute, a property owner could be prevented from 
developing his/her property even though the municipality might 
have no present desire to annex the property. The trial court 
instead adopted an interpretation of the statute that would 
accord with accepted principles of statutory interpretation, 
prevent confusion and undue delay, but still fully protect the 
interests of the municipality involved. This interpretation 
should be upheld. 
See V., infra p. 34. 
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III. 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY UPHELD 
THE COUNTY'S DECISION ON THE RECORD 
Sandy City additionally claims that the District Court 
erred as a matter of law in upholding the Planning Commission 
and County Commission's factual determination that Chevron's 
application met applicable requirements. Sandy's argument is 
based upon Section 19.84.090 of the Salt Lake County 
Ordinances, which provides: 
19.84.090 Conditions for Approval. 
The planning commission shall not 
authorize a conditional use permit unless the 
evidence presented is such as to establish: 
A. That the proposed use at the 
particular location is necessary or desirable 
to provide a service or facility which will 
contribute to the general well-being of the 
neighborhood and the community and 
B. That such use will not, under the 
circumstances of the particular case, be 
detrimental to the health, safety or general 
welfare of persons residing or working in the 
vicinity, or injurious to property or 
improvements in the vicinity; and 
C. That the proposed use will comply 
with the regulations and conditions specified 
in this title for such use; and 
D. That the proposed use will conform to 
the intent of the county master plan. (Prior 
code § 22-31-2(5)(part)). 
Sandy contends that the evidence before the County 
entities was insufficient to support their decision to grant 
the permit. This argument demonstrates Sandy City's lack of 
-24-
understanding of the standard of review to be employed by the 
District Court in reviewing the decisions of the Salt Lake 
County Planning Commission and Salt Lake County Commission. 
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that 
zoning decisions by counties are legislative in nature and that 
the courts should not interfere with judgment of the local 
jurisdiction unless there is no reasonable basis whatsoever to 
justify the decision. Naylor v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 
398 P.2d 27 (Utah 1965); Crestwood Holladay Home Owners Assn. 
v. Engh Floral Co., 545 P.2d 1150 (Utah 1976). The same 
deferential standard of review at the district court level 
applies to county decisions to grant conditional use permits. 
Cottonwood Heights Citizens Assn. v. Board of County 
Commissioner of Salt Lake County, 593 P.2d 138 (Utah 1979). 
Review is limited to the record at the County level; the 
complaining party is not entitled to a de novo hearing on 
factual issues considered by the County. Peatross v. Board of 
County Commissioners, 555 P.2d 281 (Utah 1976). 
B. THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO 
SUPPORT THE COUNTY DECISION 
Contrary to Sandy's assertions in its appellate brief, 
the Planning Commission and County Commission did not have 
before them significant evidence concerning each required 
element of County Ordinance 19.84.090. Members of the White 
City Community Council, which includes the area in question, 
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testified to community support and desire for the proposal. 
The County Traffic Engineer provided evidence that no 
additional traffic problems would be caused by the Chevron 
station, and that traffic safety might well be improved. The 
Planning Commission filed indicated approval by all county 
health and safety agencies. Representatives of Chevron and of 
the sellers also testified as to the community benefits 
accruing from the proposal. 
More importantly, the Planning Commission had 
voluminous documentation before it concerning the proposed 
Chevron station. This documentation, which makes up scores of 
pages of the record before both the District Court and this 
Court, included plans, correspondence, responses to County 
inquiries, and documents concerning compliance with the County 
master plan. The County entities had ample evidence before 
them to support their decision to grant the permits. On the 
basis of the record before it, the District Court justifiably 
held as a matter of law that the County had a reasonable basis 
for its decision and that its decision was not arbitrary and 
capricious. Naylor v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 398 P.2d 27 
(Utah 1965). 
Chevron does not dispute that Sandy introduced 
contrary evidence at the County level. It is irrelevant for 
purposes of summary judgment that factual disputes may have 
existed at the County level concerning the necessity and 
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community benefit of the proposed project. The only issue 
before the District Court was whether the County entities had 
any evidence before them supporting the decision they made. 
The District Court could decide this issue from the record; the 
issue was therefore proper for summary judgment. The Utah 
Supreme Court has said of District Court review of County 
zoning decisions: 
[Ojrdinarily, where the lower tribunal, acting 
within the scope of its authority, has 
conducted a hearing and arrived at a decision, 
the reviewing court will examine only the 
Certified records; and will not interfere with 
matters of discretion or upset the actions of 
the lower tribunal except upon a showing that 
the tribunal acted in excess of its authority 
or in a manner so clearly outside of reason 
that the action must be deemed arbitrary and 
capricious. Peatross v. Board of County 
Comm'rs, 555 P.2d at 284. 
Sandy City would have the Courts interfere with 
reasonable legislative decisions of the County Commission based 
on substantial evidence. The District Court employed a proper 
standard of review, and chose not to so interfere. Its 
decision should be upheld. 
C. THE CHEVRON PERMIT COMPLIES WITH THE MASTER PLAN 
In its appeal, Sandy City argues that the proposed 
commercial use is inconsistent with the County Master 
Plan. 
Interestingly enough, Sandy itself has permitted 
significant commercial development directly across the street 
from the Chevron, on a tract with an identical designation in 
the master plan. 
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The relevant ordinance merely requires a finding that the 
proposed use conforms to the intent of the County Master 
Plan. Ordinance Section 19.84.090(D). As noted by the 
Planning Commission, the County Master Plan was intended to 
provide for commercial development at major intersections. The 
Planning Commission also found that the character of the 
intersection has changed to commercial since the adoption of 
the Master Plan. More importantly, the Little Cottonwood 
Master Plan was a ten-year plan that expired by its terms in 
1985. Since it was formulated in 1976, enormous growth has 
taken place in the south county. County officials may properly 
take notice of conditions in their jurisdiction in making their 
decisions. A county is not bound by an outdated Master Plan in 
its land use decisions. Naylor v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 
410 P.2d 764 (Utah 1966). Approval of the conditional use is 
consistent with the intent of the County Master Plan, and 
therefore does not violate Section 19.84.090(D). 
This conclusion also finds ample support in the case 
law. Courts hold that "comprehensive" or "master" plans are 
merely advisory. A statutory requirement that zoning decisions 
conform to the intent of a master plan "does not require that 
governing bodies, as a matter of law, zone their land as it 
appears on their land use map. . . . " Rather, the governing 
body must "make a factual inquiry into whether the requested 
zoning ordinance or amendment reflects the goals of, and takes 
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into account those factors in, the comprehensive plan in light 
of the present circumstances surrounding the request." Bone 
v. City of Lewiston, 693 P.2d 1046, 1052 (Idaho 1984); Town 
of Bedford v. Mt. Kisco, 33 N.Y.2d 178, 351 N.Y.S.2d 129, 306 
N.E.2d 155 (1973) (zoning amendment was not inconsistent with 
10-year old master plan, in view of intervening change in 
character of area). Furthermore, Chevron's proposed use is 
consistent with the present C-2 zoning for the property. This 
zoning change is effective to modify the County Master Plan. 
See Town of Bedford v. Mt. Kisco, supra. 
IV. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS A PROPER 
REMEDY UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES 
A. NO MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT BAR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Once the legal issues raised in this appeal are 
determined, the purported material issues of fact raised by 
Sandy dissolve. Summary judgment is not precluded where 
factual issues exist, but only where a material fact is 
genuinely controverted. Heglar Ranch, Inc. v. Stillman, 619 
P.2d 1390 (Utah 1980). The purported issues of fact raised by 
Sandy - valuation, willingness to annex, and evidence before 
the County - are simply not material in light of the applicable 
law set forth ab ove. The District CourtTs correctly held that 
no material issues of fact existed, and that Chevron was 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
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B. THE COURTTS EVIDENTIARY RULINGS WERE CORRECT 
1. Denial of Sandy's Motion to Strike Was Proper. 
Sandy City contends that the District Court erred in denying 
Sandy City's Motion to Strike and in ostensibly relying upon 
evidence claimed inadmissible by Sandy. This argument by 
Sandy, and the Motion to Strike itself, are both deceptive and 
ill-founded in law. The initial misconception that Sandy makes 
is that a movant for summary judgment may make a statement of 
undisputed fact only if the statement is supported by 
affidavit. In fact, Rule 56(c) Utah R. Civ. P., allows the 
Court to rely upon pleadings and other materials in the record 
in determining if summary judgment is proper. 
The extent of Sandy City's misconception of the law is 
revealed by Sandy's objections to statements taken from its 
own pleadings. A glaring example is Sandy's objection to 
12 Chevron*s statement of legal description of the property. 
Sandy Motion to Strike, r. 175. 
Other examples of Sandy's objections to Chevron's use of 
Sandy's own verified statements include but are not limited 
to: objection to Chevron statement that the Sellers applied 
for rezoning; objection to statement that the County Commission 
approved the rezoning; the statement that the sellers sought to 
rezone the property; objection to statement of date the 
rezoning ordinance was published; and the purpose of the 
Chevron conditional use application (Sandy City Motion to 
Strike, r. 175). These statements are, respectively, taken 
directly from the Sandy verified complaint at UH 8, 10, 8, 10 
and Exhibit D. Even were Sandy not estopped to object to its 
own statements, these statements may be used for purposes of 
summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56(c). 
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This legal description is identical to that contained in 
paragraph 7 of Sandy's verified complaint, yet Sandy considers 
it hearsay and without proper foundation or oath. As part of 
the pleadings before the court, facts of this type may clearly 
be considered under Rule 56(c). In any event, Sandy City is 
estopped to object to its own judicial statements. See Sailes 
v. Jones, 499 P.2d 721 (Ariz. App. 1972). 
Sandy's objections to other statements are either 
unfounded in law or irrelevant. For instance, Sandy claims 
that the District Court relied on inadmissible evidence in 
concluding that the City had failed to express its willingness 
to annex. As set forth in Section II, supra, § 10-2-418 
requires an affirmative and binding declaration of willingness 
to annex in addition to the policy declaration. All evidence 
before the Court indicated that no such formal declaration of 
willingness had been made. For instance, three separate 
documents filed with the District Court by Sandy stated only 
that the City was considering annexation. The only statement 
of purported willingness to annex was an obviously non-binding 
statement made by counsel for Sandy at one of the Planning 
Commission hearings. Chevron's statement -- and the Court's 
finding -- that Sandy had not declared willingness to annex in 
the manner required by statute was justified. 
2. Evidence of Value. Sandy states that Chevron's 
contentions concerning the costs of the Chevron project before 
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the Court were unsupported. Sandy neglects to mention that 
Chevron submitted the affidavit of David E. Jenkins (to which 
no objection was or has been made by Sandy) specifically 
concerning valuation of the property. Mr. Jenkins, the 
consulting engineer in charge of Chevron's property 
development, specifically indicated construction costs at the 
$175,000 contained in the building permit. (Addendum 3). More 
importantly, Sandy's objection is irrelevant because, as a 
matter of law, land and fixture costs are not included in the 
"costs of development" for the purposes of the urban 
development statute. Even if Sandy's evidence of valuation is 
correct, the Chevron station is not urban development. Chevron 
is entitled to judgment on this issue as a matter of law; 
Sandy's objection is immaterial. 
C. THE COUNTY RECORDS WERE PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT 
Sandy City also assigns error to the District Court's 
consideration of certain documents submitted to the District 
Court by defendant Salt Lake County. The documents involved 
make up the Supplemental Record in this action, and primarily 
consist of Planning Commission and County Commission documents 
concerning the applications in question, as well as copies of 
the County Master Plan. These documents were submitted by the 
County defendants in accordance with Peatross v. Board of 
County Commissioners, supra, where the Utah Supreme Court 
held of review of County decisions: "ordinarily, where the 
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lower tribunal, acting within the scope of its authority, has 
conducted a hearing and arrived at a decision, the reviewing 
court will examine only the certified records", 555 P.2d at 
284. 
The District Court properly considered the County 
records in making its decision. In reviewing the actions of a 
county legislative body, records of that body are properly 
before the Court. Peatross, supra. The County records are 
not affidavits subject to the filing deadlines contained in 
Rule 6(e), Utah R. Civ. P., as Sandy argues. Instead, as 
records of proceedings below, they were proper for 
consideration for the Court at any time during its review of 
13 the County decision. Sandy had full access to all 
materials from County files; it in fact submitted portions of 
the County records with its own memoranda. 
Sandyfs true problem with the County records is not 
when they were admitted, but rather what they reveal--a 
plethora of evidence supporting the County entities' decision 
to permit Chevron to build its station. 
After Sandy objected to their introduction at the summary 
judgment hearing, defendant Salt Lake County filed a written 
motion for their certification and admission, which the Court 
granted and which Sandy did not appeal. 
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V. 
FAILURE TO ALLOW DISCOVERY 
DID NOT PREJUDICE SANDY CITY 
The District Court did not abuse its discretion by 
granting summary judgment to defendants prior to allowing 
certain discovery requested by Sandy City. Sandy asserts that 
the Court's decision to grant summary judgment violated Rule 56 
(f), Utah R. Civ. P., which permits a court to deny or continue 
a motion for summary judgment where the opposing party cannot 
present facts essential to justify opposition to this motion. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f). The party opposing summary judgment 
must present by affidavit the dispositive facts it believes 
discovery would disclose. Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co., 
745 P.2d 838 (Utah App. 1987). 
Sandy's counsel filed an affidavit with the lower 
court claiming that discovery would have allowed it to develop 
certain information sufficient to defeat summary judgment in 
favor of defendants. Review of the facts that Sandy believes 
discovery would disclose indicates that none would change the 
outcome of this action. 
Sandy initially argues that it did not have certain 
County Commission minutes at the time. These minutes were 
subsequently certified to the District Court and were a portion 
of the record available to the court in making its decision. 
Second, Sandy argues that discovery would disclose that the 
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zoning and conditional use applications did not meet the 
14 
standards necessary for approval under county ordinances. 
Sandy's contention shows its misconception of the standard of 
review of County decisions. The Planning Commission and County 
Commission had evidence before them that the Chevron station 
complied with ordinance requirements. Sandy had the chance to, 
and did, provide contrary evidence. On appeal to the District 
Court, the only relevant question was whether the Planning 
Commission's decision to grant the permit was so unsupportable 
on the evidence before it, as to be arbitrary, capricious or 
unreasonable. Additional evidence going to the merits of the 
Chevron project, which Sandy contends discovery would reveal, 
has no relevance to what was essentially an appellate review by 
the District Court of the County's decision. 
Finally, Sandy argues that discovery would reveal 
additional information concerning development costs and 
compliance with state subdivision statutes. As Section I of 
Chevron's argument makes clear, the Chevron station was 
properly considered alone in determining if it was urban 
development. There is no question, even assuming Sandy's cost 
projections are true, that the Chevron station did not meet the 
For instance, Sandy stated that discovery would reveal 
that the Chevron station was in fact unnecessary, undesirable 
and detrimental to local safety, health and welfare. See 
County Ord. § 19.84.090. It is unquestioned, however, that the 
Planning Commission did hear evidence to the contrary. 
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$750,000 threshold for urban development if the "urban 
development" definition is correctly applied. Accordingly, 
further discovery on the issue of valuation would have been 
fruitless. The issue of compliance with subdivision statutes 
was not raised in Sandy's complaint or opposition to 
defendants1 motions and was not before the Court. 
Under the controlling law, the defendantsT motions for 
summary judgment would properly have been granted even if Sandy 
had discovered the facts it claims it would have. The District 
Court therefore did not abuse its discretion in hearing the 
summary judgment motions prior to discovery by Sandy. 
VI. 
POLICY FACTORS FAVOR UPHOLDING 
THE DISTRICT COURT 
Sandy City places great emphasis upon the purported 
anti-development policies underlying the urban development 
statute. Sandy's view of the policies behind Section 10-2-418 
is too limited. It is correct that one of the purposes behind 
section 10-2-418 is protection of the interests of 
municipalities. But the statute balances these interests 
against the interests of those owning property near a 
municipality and the interests of the County. Municipal 
interests are protected because developments of a certain 
character--those constituting urban development--will be 
restricted if the municipality is willing to annex the 
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property. The other side of this policy is that property 
owners may develop under County supervision where annexation is 
uncertain or where the project is not large enough to 
constitute urban development. 
Sandy would have the benefit of the statute without 
accepting its limitations. In seeking a conditional use permit 
for its service station, Chevron went to the governmental 
authority having unquestioned jurisdiction over the Chevron 
parcel--Salt Lake County. Chevron's permit application 
concerned the Chevron parcel and station alone, not any other 
proposed development. At the time Chevron applied, it had 
received no binding commitment or declaration from Sandy City 
that Sandy desired to annex the property as a precondition of 
development. As the District Court recognized, the Chevron 
station simply does not, as a matter of law, fall within the 
statute. 
Sandy additionally complains that the varying interest 
of the Municipality, the County, and area residents could only 
be "balanced" through the annexation process, in which public 
hearings would be held and citizens heard. This "balancing" is 
what in fact took place. At least four public hearings were 
held concerning the future of the property. Interested 
parties, including Sandy, had additional opportunities to 
submit written comments to the Planning Commission and County 
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Commission. Sandy took full advantage of these forums. 
Sandy's true complaint is not that its interests were not 
properly balanced, as it asserts. Its complaint is instead 
that the County Commission, after hearing the parties and 
reviewing the evidence, came to a different conclusion than 
Sandy would have. This disagreement provides no basis for 
overriding the legislative determinations of Salt Lake County 
concerning property with the County. 
CONCLUSION 
Chevron is caught in a jurisdictional turf battle 
between two governmental entities. It sought approval from the 
governmental entity--Salt Lake County--within whose boundaries 
the Chevron parcel lay. That was the only entity with 
jurisdiction to act. That approval was granted after 
substantial review, comment and consideration of evidence. The 
record on appeal discloses that this approval was granted in 
compliance with law. The purported issues of fact raised by 
Sandy are immaterial; even if resolved in Sandy's favor Chevron 
would be entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The County's 
decision concerning property within County jurisdiction was 
entitled to substantial deference upon review by the District 
Court. The District Court did so. Its decision in favor of 
Chevron should be upheld. 
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DATED this 3rd day of October, 1988. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL ,McGi 
J 
Esc 
Es; 
J. Lewi; 
in W. Andrev 
Attorneys f or^Ch^tojr^U. S . A. Inc, 
50 South Main,N~^uite 1600 
P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused four (4) true and 
correct copies of the within and foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
CHEVRON U.S.A. INC. to be mailed, postage prepaid, this 3rd day 
of October, 1988, to the following: 
Walter R. Miller, Esq. 
Sandy City Attorney 
440 East 8680 South 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Kent Lewis, Esq. 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
2001 South State Street, #S3600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200 
Brinton R. Burbidge, Esq. 
Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell 
330 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-259? 
6225A 
-39-
ADDENDUM 
Utah Rules of C i v i l Procedure 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any 
part thereof. 
(b) For defending party, A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least 
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial contro-
versy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It 
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without sub-
stantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or 
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the 
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be 
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Support-
ing and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set 
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirma-
tively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affida-
vit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affida-
vits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or 
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judg-
ment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(0 When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits 
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of 
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the 
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused 
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or 
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
ADDENDUM I B 
Utah Code Annotated 
10-2-418. Urban development restrictions. 
Urban development shall not be approved or permitted within one-half mile 
of a municipality in the unincorporated territory which the municipality has 
proposed for municipal expansion in its policy declaration, if a municipality is 
willing to annex the territory proposed for such development under the stan-
dards and requirements set forth in this chapter; provided, however, that a 
property owner desiring to develop or improve property within the said one-
half mile area may notify the municipality in writing of said desire and iden-
tify with particularity all legal and factual barriers preventing an annexation 
to the municipality. At the end of 12 consecutive months from the filing with 
the municipality of said notice and after a good faith and diligent effort by 
said property owner to annex, said property owner may develop as otherwise 
permitted by law. Urban development beyond one-half mile of a municipality 
may be restricted or an impact statement required when agreed to in an 
interlocal agreement, under the provisions of the Interlocal Co-operation Act. 
ADDENDUM ICs 
Utah Code Annotated 
10-1-104. Definitions. 
As used in this act: 
(1) "Municipal" or "municipalities" means any city of the first class, 
city of the second class, city of the third class, or town in the state of Utah, 
but unless the context otherwise provides, the term or terms do not in-
clude counties, school districts, or any other special purpose governments. 
(2) "Governing body" means collectively the legislative body and the 
executive of any municipality. Unless otherwise provided: 
(a) In cities of the first and second class, the governing body is the 
city commission; 
(b) In cities of the third class, the governing body is the city coun-
cil; 
(c) In towns the governing body is the town council. 
(3) "City" shall include cities of the first class, cities of the second class 
or cities of the third class or may refer cumulatively to all such cities. 
(4) 'Town" means any town as defined in § 10-2-301. 
(5) "Recorder," unless clearly inapplicable, shall include and apply to 
town clerks. 
(6) "Provisions of law" shall include other statutes of the state of Utah 
and ordinances, rules and regulations properly adopted by any municipal-
ity unless the construction is clearly contrary to the intent of state law. 
(7) "Contiguous" means abutting directly on the existing boundary of 
the annexing municipality. "Directly" includes separation by a street, 
alley, public right-of-way, creek, river or the right-of-way of a railroad or 
other public service corporation, or by lands owned by the municipality, 
by some other political subdivision of the state or by the state. 
(8) "Affected entities" means a county, municipality or other entity 
possessing taxation powers within a county, whose territory, service de-
livery or revenue will be directly and significantly affected by a proposed 
boundary change involving a municipality or other local entity. 
(9) "Peninsula" means an area of unincorporated territory surrounded 
on more than one-half of its boundary distance, but not completely, by 
incorporated territory and situated so that the length of a line drawn 
across the unincorporated area from an incorporated area to an incorpo-
rated area on the opposite side shall be less than 25% of the total aggre-
gate boundaries of the unincorporated area. 
(10) "Island" means unincorporated territory completely surrounded by 
incorporated area of one or more municipalities. 
(11) "Urban development" means a housing subdivision involving 
more than 15 residential units with an average of less than one acre per 
residential unit or a commercial or industrial development for which cost 
projections exceed $750,000 for any or all phases. 
ADDENDUM I D 
S a l e Lake County Ordinances 
Chapter 19-34 
CONDITIONAL USES 
Sections: 
19.84.010 Purpose. 
19.84.020 Conditional use permit 
required when. 
19.84.030 Application requirements— 
Fee. 
19.84.040 Public hearing. 
19.84.050 Determination of commission. 
19.84.060 Delegation of approval 
authority. 
19.84.070 Policies established. 
19.84.080 Review by planning 
commission. 
19.84.090 Conditions for approval. 
19.84.100 Appeal of planning director 
decision. 
19.84.110 Appeal of planning commission 
decision. 
19.84.120 Inspection. 
19.84.130 Time limit. 
19.84.140 Sale of alcoholic beverages. 
19.84.010 Purpose. 
The purpose of this chapter is to allow the 
proper integration into the county of uses which 
may be suitable only in certain locations in the 
county or zoning district, or only if such uses are 
designed or laid out on the site in a panicular 
manner. (Prior code § 22-31-1) 
19.84.020 Conditional use permit required 
when. 
A conditional use permit shall be required for 
all uses listed as conditional uses in the district 
regulations or elsewhere in this title. A condi-
tional use permit may be revoked upon failure in 
compliance with conditions precedent to the 
original approval of the permit. (Prior code § 
22-3l-2(pan)) 
19.84.030 Application requirements—Fee. 
A. Application for a conditional use permit 
shall be made by the property owner or certified 
agent thereof to the planning commission. 
B. Accompanying Documents. Detailed site 
plans drawn to scale and other drawings neces-
sary to assist the planning commission in arriv-
ing at an appropriate decision. 
C. Fee. The fee for any conditional use permit 
shall be as provided for in Section 3.52.040 of 
this code. (Prior code § 22-31-2(1)—(3)) 
19.84.040 Public hearing. 
No public hearing need be held: however, a 
hearing may be held when the planning commis-
sion shall deem such a hearing to be necessary in 
the public interest. 
A. The planning commission may delegate to 
the planning director the holding of the hearing. 
B. The planning director shall submit to the 
planning commission a record of the hearing. 
together with a report of findings and recommen-
dations relative thereto, for the consideration of 
the planning commission. 
C. Such hearing, if deemed necessary, shall be 
held not more than thirty days from the date of 
application. The panicular time and place shall 
be established by the planning director. 
D. The planning director shall publish a 
notice of hearing in a newspaper of general cir-
culation in the county not less than ten days prior 
to the date of the hearing. Failure of property 
owners to receive notice of the hearing shall in no 
way affect the validity of action taken. (Prior 
code §22-31-2(4)) 
19.84.050 Determination of commission. 
The planning commission may permit a con-
ditional use to be located within any district in 
which the panicular conditional use is permitted 
by the use regulations of this title. In authorizing 
any conditional use the planning commission 
shall impose such requirements and conditions 
as may be necessary for the protection of adja-
cent properties and the public welfare. Such con-
ditions of approval may include but shall not be 
limited to limitations or requirements as to the 
height, size, location and design of structures, 
landscaping. density, ingress-egress, fencing, 
parking or lighting. Height, density and size 
requirements for structures in each zone are 
maximums and may be reduced or modified as 
conditions to the approval of any conditional use 
application. (Ord. of 5/29/85: prior code § 
22-31-2(5)(part)) 
19.84.060 Delegation of approval authority. 
The planning commission may delegate to the 
planning director the authority to approve, mod-
ify or deny all or part of the conditional uses set 
forth in this title. (Prior code § 22-31-2(5)(part)) 
19.34.070 Policies established. 
The planning commission shall establish pol-
icies regarding landscaping, fencing, lighting, 
ingress-egress, height of buildings, etc.. to guide 
the decision of the planning director to ensure 
consistency in the issuance of conditional use 
permits. (Prior code § 22-3l-2(5)(pan)) 
19.84.080 Review by planning commission. 
The planning director is authorized to bring 
any conditional use permit application before 
the planning commission if, in his opinion, the 
general public interest will be better served by 
review of the planning commission. (Priorcode § 
22-3i-2(5)(part)) 
19.84.090 Conditions for approval. 
The planning commission shall not authorize 
a conditional use permit unless the evidence pre-
sented is such as to establish: 
A. That the proposed use at the particular 
location is necessary or desirable to provide a 
service or facility which will contribute to the 
general well-being of the neighborhood and the 
community: and 
B. That such use will not. under the circum-
stances of the particular case, be detrimental to 
the health, safety or general welfare of persons 
residing or working in the vicinity, or injurious to 
property or improvements in the vicinity: and 
C. That the proposed use will comply with the 
regulations and conditions specified in this title 
for such use: and 
D. That the proposed use will conform to the 
intent of the county master plan. (Prior code $ 
22-3l-2(5)(part)) 
19.84.100 Appeal of planning director 
decision. 
Any person shall have the right to appeal the 
decision of the planning director to the planning 
commission by filing a letter with the planning 
commission within five days of the planning 
director's action, stating the reason for the appeal 
and requesting a hearing before the planning 
commission at the earliest regular meeting of the 
commission. (Priorcode § 22-31-2(5)(part)) 
19.84.110 Appeal of planning commission 
decision. 
A. Any person shall have the right to appeal to 
the board of county commissioners any decision 
rendered by the planning commission by filing in 
writing, and in triplicate, stating the reasons for 
the appeal with the board of county commis-
sioners within ten days following the date upon 
which the decision is made by the planning com-
mission. After receiving the appeal the county 
commission may reaffirm the planning commis-
sion decision or set a date for a public hearing. 
B. Notification of Planning Commission. 
The board of county commissioners shall notify 
the planning commission of the date of the 
review, in writing, at least seven days preceding 
the date set for hearing so that the planning com-
mission may prepare the record for the hearing. 
C. Determination by Board of County Com-
missioners. The board of county commissioners 
after proper review of the decision of the plan-
ning commission may affirm, reverse, alter or 
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19.84.110 
remand for further review and consideration any 
action taken by the planning commission. (Prior 
code § 22-3i-2(5)(part)) 
19,84.120 Inspection. 
Following the issuance of a conditional use 
permit by the planning commission the director 
of building inspection shall approve an applica-
tion for a building permit pursuant to Chapter 
19.94 of this title and shall ensure that develop-
ment is undertaken and completed in com-
pliance with the permits. (Prior code § 
22-31-2(5)(part)) 
19-84.130 Time limit. 
Unless there is a substantial action under a 
conditional use permit within a maximum 
period of one year of its issuance, the conditional 
use permit shall expire. The planning commis-
sion may grant, a maximum extension of six 
months under exceptional circumstances. (Prior 
code § 22-31-2(5)(pan)) 
19.84.140 Sale of alcoholic beverages. 
A. The planning commission shall authorize 
a conditional use permit to sell alcoholic bev-
erages except Class A beer outlets and Class B 
beer outlets where it is determined by the plan-
ning commission: 
1. That the use is not in the immediate prox-
imity of any school, church, library, public play-
ground, or park: 
2. That the proposed use at a particular loca-
tion is necessary and desirable to provide the 
service or facility which will contribute to the 
general well-being of the neighborhood and the 
community: and 
3. That such use will not. under the circum-
stances of the particular case, be detrimental to 
the health, safety or general welfare of persons 
residing or working in the vicinity, orinjurious to 
property or improvements in the vicinity: and 
4. That the proposed use will comply with 
regulations and conditions specified in this title 
for such use: and 
5. That the proposed use will conform to the 
intent of the county master plan. 
B. AH conditional use permits for uses dispen-
sig alcoholic beverages to be consumed on the 
premises are subject to an annual review, and all 
applications for a conditional use permit for con-
sumption of liquor or beer on the premises must 
be accompanied by a payment of fees as provided 
in Section 3.52.040. The fees are considered rea-
sonable because of the costs of investigation and 
studies necessary for the administration hereof. 
C. The granting of any permit by the planning 
commission to dispense alcoholic beverages is 
subject to review by the county commission. The 
denial of any permit by the planning commission 
to dispense alcoholic beverages is subject to 
review by the district courts. All appeals of plan-
ning commission decisions to the board of coun-
ty commissioners or the district courts must be 
filed with the appropriate body within thirty days 
from the date of the planning commission deci-
sion. (Ord. 804.1982: prior code § 22-31-4) 
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